An analysis of steganographic systems subject to the following perfect undetectability condition is presented in this paper. Following embedding of the message into the covertext, the resulting stegotext is required to have exactly the same probability distribution as the covertext. Then no statistical test can reliably detect the presence of the hidden message. We refer to such steganographic schemes as perfectly secure. A few such schemes have been proposed in recent literature, but they have vanishing rate. We prove that communication performance can potentially be vastly improved; specifically, our basic setup assumes independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) covertext, and we construct perfectly secure steganographic codes from public watermarking codes using binning methods and randomized permutations of the code. The permutation is a secret key shared between encoder and decoder. We derive (positive) capacity and random-coding exponents for perfectly-secure steganographic systems. The error exponents provide estimates of the code length required to achieve a target low error probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information embedding refers to the embedding of data within a cover object (also referred to as covertext) such as image, video, audio, graphics, text, or packet transmission times [1] - [5] . Applications include copyright protection, database annotation, transaction tracking, traitor tracing, timing channels, and multiuser communications.
These applications often impose the requirement that embedding only slightly perturbs the covertext. The name watermarking has been widely used to describe information embedding techniques that are perceptually transparent, i.e., the marked object (after embedding) is perceptually similar to the cover object.
In some applications, the presence of the embedded information should be kept secret (see applications below).
Then perceptual transparency is not sufficient, because statistical analysis could reveal the presence of hidden information. The problem of embedding information that is hard to detect is called steganography, and the marked object is called stegotext [3] , [4] , [6] - [8] . Steganography differs from cryptography in that the presence of the message needs to remain secret, rather than the value of the message. The dual problem to steganography is steganalysis, that is, detection of hidden information within a stegotext.
A classical model for steganography is Simmons' prisoner problem [9] . Alice and Bob are locked up in different cells but are allowed to communicate under the vigilant eye of Willie, the prison warden. If Willie detects the presence of hidden information in the transmitted data, he terminates their communication and subjects them to a punishment. Willie is a passive warden if he merely observes and analyzes the transmitted data. He is an active warden if he introduces noise to make Alice and Bob's task more difficult.
In the information age, there are several application scenarios for steganography. 1) Steganography may be used to communicate over public networks such as the Internet. One may embed bits into inconspicuous files that are routinely sent over such networks: images, video, audio files, etc. Users of such technology may include intelligence and military personnel, people that are subject to censorship, and more generally, people who have a need for privacy.
2) Steganography may also be used to communicate over private networks. For instance, confidential documents within a commercial or governmental organization could be marked with identifiers that are hard to detect.
The purpose is to trace unauthorized use of a document to a particular person who received a copy of this document. The recipient of the marked documents should not be aware of the presence of these identifiers.
3) Timing channels can be used to leak out information about computers. A pirate could modify the timing of packets sent by the computer, encoding data that reside on that computer. The pirate wishes to make this information leakage undetectable to avoid arousing suspicion. To disrupt potential information leakage, the network could jam packet timings -hence the network plays the role of an active warden.
The channel over which the stegotext is transmitted could be noiseless or noisy, corresponding to the case of a passive and an active warden, respectively. Moreover, the steganographer's ability to choose the covertext is often limited if not altogether nonexistent. In the private-network application above, the covertext is generated by a content provider, not by the steganographer (i.e., the authority responsible for document security). Similarly in the timing-channel application, the covertext is generated by the computer, not by the pirate.
In view of these applications, the four basic attributes of a steganographic code are: 1) detectability: quantifying Willie's ability to detect the presence of hidden information;
2) transparency (fidelity): closeness of covertext and stegotext under an appropriate distortion (fidelity) metric;
3) payload: the number of bits embedded in the covertext; and 4) robustness: quantifying decoding reliability in presence of channel noise (i.e., when Willie is an active warden).
If Alice had complete freedom for choosing the covertext, the transparency requirement would be immaterial. A covertext would not even be needed: it would suffice for Alice to generate objects that follow a prescribed covertext distribution. This model has two shortcomings: (a) as mentioned above, in some applications Alice has little or no control over the choice of the covertext; (b) even if she has, covertexts have complicated distributions, and generating a size-M steganographic code by sampling the covertext distribution would be highly impractical for large M .
Information theory is a natural framework for studying steganography and steganalysis. Assuming a statistical model is available for covertexts, the only truly secure strategy from the steganographer's point of view is to ensure that the probability distributions of the covertext and stegotext are identical. This strong notion of security was proposed by Cachin [10] and is the steganographic counterpart of Shannon's notion of perfect security in cryptography. We refer to steganography that satisfies this strong property as perfectly secure.
framework. The basic mathematical model for steganography is communications with side information at the encoder [26] . Moulin and O'Sullivan studied a general information-theoretic framework for information hiding and indicated its applicability to steganography [27, Section VII.C]. However, they did not study perfectly secure steganography and did not derive expressions for steganographic capacity. Galand and Kabatiansky [28] constructed steganographic binary codes, but the code rate vanishes as log N N . Fridrich et al. [29] , [30] proposed positive-rate "wet paper" codes, which permit a change from the original cover distribution to a new stegodistribution. However they did not analyze the fundamental tradeoffs between payload, robustness, and detectability.
The goal of this paper is therefore to study the information-theoretic limits of perfectly undetectable steganography.
As a first step towards this problem, we assume that covertext samples are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over a finite alphabet. In practice the i.i.d. model could be applied to transform coefficients or to blocks of coefficients. While this is just a simplifying approximation to actual statistics, it allows us to derive tangible mathematical results and to understand the effects of the perfect security constraint on transparency, payload, and robustness. Our first result is a connection between public watermarking codes [27] , [31] , [32] and perfectly secure steganographic codes. Given any public watermarking code that preserves the first-order statistics of the covertext (this property will be referred to as order-1 security), we show that a perfectly secure steganographic code with the same error probability can be constructed using randomization over the set of all permutations of {1, 2, · · · , N }. We use this construction to derive capacity and random-coding exponent formulas for perfectly secure steganography.
The codes that achieve capacity and random-coding exponents are stacked-binning schemes as proposed in [33] for general problems of channel coding with side information. The random-coding exponent yields an asymptotic upper bound on achievable error probability and therefore serves as an estimate of the code length required to achieve a target low error probability. A stacked-binning code consists of a stack of variable-size codeword arrays indexed by the type of the covertext sequence, and the corresponding decoder is a maximum penalized mutual information (MPMI) decoder. The analysis is based on the method of types [34] , [35] .
Due to the added perfect-security constraint, capacity and random-coding exponent for steganography cannot exceed those of the corresponding public watermarking problem. Nevertheless, we have identified a class of problems where the covertext probability mass function (PMF) is uniform and the distortion function is symmetric, with the property that the perfect undetectability constraint does not cause any capacity loss. One special example in the general class is the case of Bernoulli( 1 2 ) covertexts with the Hamming distortion metric [36] . For the binaryHamming case, the perfect security condition has no effect on both the capacity and random-coding error exponent.
Steganographic capacity is achieved by randomized nested linear codes. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the notation, and Section III the problem statement.
Section IV shows how perfectly secure steganographic codes can be constructed from codes with the much weaker order-1 security. Section V presents our main theorems on capacity and random-coding error exponent. Section VI discusses the role of secret keys in steganographic codes. Simplified results for the no-attack case are stated in Section VII. A class of steganography problems for which perfect security comes at no cost is studied in Section VIII.
As an example of this class, the binary-Hamming problem is studied in Section IX. The paper concludes with a February 16, 2007 . Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT discussion in Section X.
II. NOTATION
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, and boldface letters for sequences. The PMF of a random variable X ∈ X is denoted by p X = {p X (x), x ∈ X }. The entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y 
Let p x denote the empirical PMF on X induced by a sequence x ∈ X N . Then p x is called the type of x. The type class T x associated with p x is the set of all sequences of type p x . Likewise, we define the joint type p xy of a pair of sequences (x, y) ∈ X N × Y N and the type class T xy associated with p xy . The conditional type p y|x of a pair of sequences (x, y) is defined as
for all x ∈ X such that p x (x) > 0. The conditional type class T y|x given x is the set of all sequencesỹ such that (x,ỹ) ∈ T xy . We denote by H(x) the empirical entropy for x, i.e., the entropy of the empirical PMF p x . Similarly, we denote by I(x; y) the empirical mutual information for the joint PMF p xy . The above notation for types is adopted from Csiszár and Körner [34] .
We let U(Ω) denote the uniform PMF over a finite set Ω. We let P X and P 
We use ln x to denote the natural logarithm of x, and the logarithm log x is in base 2 if not specified otherwise.
The notation 1 {A} is the indicator function of the event A:
Finally, we adopt the notional convention that the minimum (resp. maximum) of a function over an empty set is +∞ (resp. 0). ) which can be modified to some extent without affecting perceptual quality [27] .
The strength of the transparency constraint is controlled by a distortion parameter.
A steganalyzer observes X and tests whether X is drawn i. are also required to be close according to some distortion metric. The alphabets S, X and Y for S, X and Y , respectively, are assumed to be identical.
The decoder does not know p Y|X selected by the steganalyzer and does not have access to the original covertext S. The decoder produces an estimateM = φ N (Y) ∈ M of the transmitted message. We assume that the encoder/decoder pair (f N , φ N ) is randomized, i.e., the choice of (f N , φ N ) is a function of a random variable known only to the encoder and decoder but not to the steganalyzer. We can think of this random variable as a secret key as in [27] , [31] , [32] . Note that in generic information-hiding games, this secret key provides some protection against adversaries with arbitrary memory and unlimited computational resources [4, Section X]. In steganography, the secret key plays a fundamental role in ensuring perfect undetectability: the covertext and the stegotext have the same PMF when the secret key is carefully designed. The randomized code will be denoted by (F N , Φ N ) with a joint distribution p(f N , φ N ).
A. Steganographic Codes
A distortion function is any nonnegative function d : S × S → R + ∪ {0}. This definition is extended to length-N vectors using d
We assume without loss of generality that d(s, x) ≥ 0, with equality if s = x. 
and the perfect undetectability constraint
• φ N : S N → M maps the received sequence y to a decoded messagem = φ N (y).
The above definition is similar to the definitions for a length-N data-embedding or watermarking code in [27] , [31] , [32] , with the additional steganographic constraint of (2) which requires perfect matching of N -dimensional distributions. Also observe that the distortion constraint is inactive if D 1 ≥ D max , i.e., the covertext S available to Alice plays no role. Given p S , define the set of conditional PMFs p X|S such that the marginals of p S p X|S are equal (p X = p S ) and the expected distortion between S and X does not exceed D 1 :
Also recall that in Def. 1, randomization of (F N , Φ N ) is realized via a cryptographic key shared by encoder and decoder.
Next, we define CCC and RM codes which will be used to construct perfectly secure steganographic codes. 
Definition 2: (CCC Code
Observe that such a code matches the first-order empirical marginal PMF of the covertext, but not necessarily higher-order empirical marginals. Hence such a code generally does not satisfy the perfect-undetectability property.
Definition 3: (RM Code).
A length-N randomly modulated code is the randomized code defined via permutations of a prototype (f N , φ N ):
where π is drawn uniformly from the set Π of all N ! permutations and is not revealed to Willie. The sequence πx is obtained by applying π to the elements of x.
Definition 4:
Given alphabets S and U, a steganographic channel p XU|S (x, u|s) subject to distortion D 1 is a conditional PMF whose conditional marginal p X|S belongs to Q Steg 1
the set of steganographic channels subject to distortion D 1 when the alphabet U has cardinality L.
If the channel p XU|S satisfies the distortion constraint D 1 but not necessarily the steganographic constraint p X = p S , p XU|S is simply a covert channel in the sense of [27] , [31] . We shall denote by Q(L, p S , D 1 ) the set of all such covert channels. Clearly,
B. Attack Channels
A passive warden simply produces Y = X. An active warden passes X through a discrete memoryless channel (DMC), producing a degraded sequence Y.
Definition 5:
A discrete memoryless attack channel p Y |X is feasible if the expected distortion between X and Y is at most D 2 :
Then the joint conditional PMF is given by
We denote by
the set of all such feasible DMCs. This set is a compound DMC family.
As an alternative to Def. 5, one may consider attack channels that have arbitrary memory but are subject to an almost sure distortion constraint [31] - [33] . In this case, the set of feasible attack channels is given by
There are three reasons why only memoryless channels are considered in this paper. First, it is shown in [33] that for watermarking problems, both DMCs with expected distortion and arbitrary memory attack channels with almost sure distortion result in the same capacity formula, and the former allows a smaller random-coding error exponent when D 2 is the same. Thus, in terms of minimizing the random-coding exponent, selecting p Y |X from the compound DMC class A(p X , D 2 ) is a better strategy for the warden than selecting
Second, the assumption of memorylessness simplifies the presentation of main ideas. Finally, note that the proofs for the compound DMC provide the basis for the proofs in the case of channels with arbitrary memory [32] , [33] .
C. Steganographic Capacity and Reliability Function
The probability of error for a randomized code (F N , Φ N ) under a channel p Y |X is given by
where the average is over all possible covertexts S, messages M , and codes (F N , Φ N ).
Definition 6:
A rate R is achievable if there exists a randomized code (F N , Φ N ) such that |M| ≥ 2 N R and
is the supremum of all achievable rates.
Definition 8:
The steganographic reliability function E Steg (R) is defined as
IV. FROM ORDER-1 TO PERFECTLY SECURE STEGANOGRAPHIC CODES Codes with conditionally constant composition (Def. 2) and randomly modulated codes (Def. 3) play a central role in our code constructions and coding theorems. The following proposition suggests a general construction for perfectly secure steganographic codes: first select some deterministic prototype f N with the CCC and order-1 steganographic properties and maximum distortion D 1 (Def. 2), second construct a RM code from that prototype.
In Section V we show that this strategy is an optimal one. The proof of the proposition appears in the appendix.
be a RM code whose prototype (f N , φ N ) has conditionally constant composition, order-1 security, and maximum distortion D 1 . Then (M, F N , Φ N ) is a perfectly secure steganographic code with maximum distortion D 1 and same error probability as the prototype (f N , φ N ).
V. STEGANOGRAPHIC CAPACITY AND RANDOM CODING ERROR EXPONENT
The steganographic codes in our achievability proofs are randomly-modulated binning codes with conditionally constant composition. The existence of a good deterministic prototype is established using a random coding
argument. An arbitrarily large integer L is selected, defining an alphabet U = {1, 2, · · · , L} for the auxiliary random variable U in the binning construction. Given the covertext s and the message m, the encoder selects an appropriate sequence u in the binning code and then generates the stegotext randomly according to the uniform distribution over an optimized type class T x|u,s . Proofs of the theorem and propositions in this section appear in Appendices II-VI.
The following difference between two mutual informations:
plays a fundamental role in the analysis.
Theorem 1: Under Def. 1 for steganographic codes and Def. 5 for the compound attack channel, steganographic capacity is given by 
and (U, S) → X → Y forms a Markov chain.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in two parts. The converse part is proved in Appendix II. The direct part is a corollary of a stronger result stated in Proposition 2 below, which provides a lower bound on the achievable error exponent (hence an upper bound on the average probability of error) and is proved in Appendix III.
Proposition 2: Under Def. 1 for steganographic codes and Def. 5 for the compound attack channel, the following random-coding error exponent is achievable:
where
Moreover, E Steg r (R) = 0 if and only if R ≥ C Steg .
Remark 1:
The capacity and error exponent formulas in (11)- (14) coincide with those for public watermarking [32] , [33] , the only difference being that here the maximization over p XU|S is subject to a steganographic
Remark 2: Proposition 2 is proved using a random binning technique. First we establish the existence of a deterministic prototype CCC code with order-1 steganographic property, maximum distortion D 1 , and error exponent
The decoder is an MPMI decoder. The main steps in this part of the proof are similar to those in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [33] , with the additional order-1 steganographic constraint on the encoder. The second part of the proof is an application of Proposition 1: random modulation of the CCC prototype code yields a perfectly-secure steganographic code with maximum distortion D 1 and error exponent E Steg (R).
Remark 3.
As mentioned earlier, the covertext plays no role in the special case D 1 ≥ D max , and so Alice can generate X independently of S. The capacity formula (11) becomes simply
and the random-coding exponent is
The binning codes are degenerate in this case; the expressions for capacity and random-coding exponents reduce to classical formulas for compound DMCs without side information [34] and are achieved using constant-composition codes. Further specializing this result to the case of a passive warden ( 
(p )
.
. . The operation of the deterministic prototype code is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The codebook C consists of a stack of codeword arrays indexed by the possible covertext sequence types. Given an input s, the encoder evaluates its type p s and selects the corresponding codeword array
in which the codewords are drawn from an optimized type class T u T * U (p s ). Each array C(p s ) has |M| columns and 2 N ρ(ps) rows, where ρ(p s ) is a function of the corresponding covertext type p s and is termed the depth parameter of the array. Given y, the decoder seeks a codeword in C = ps C(p s ) that maximizes the penalized empirical mutual information and outputs its column index as the estimated message:
By letting ρ(p s ) = I(u; s) + ǫ, where T us T * US (p s ) is an optimized joint type and ǫ is an arbitrarily small positive number, an optimal balance between the probability of encoding error and the probability of decoding error is achieved. The former vanishes double-exponentially while the latter vanishes at a rate given by the random coding error exponent in (14) . The above MPMI decoder can be thought of as an empirical generalized maximum a posterior (MAP) decoder [33, Section 3.1].
VI. SECRET KEY
In standard information-hiding problems with a compound DMC attack channel, deterministic codes are enough to achieve capacity; random coding is used as a method of proof to establish the existence of a deterministic code without actually specifying the code [37] . In our steganography problem, a randomized code is used to satisfy the perfect-undetectability condition of (2) . Without the secret key, a deterministic code generally could not satisfy the perfect-undetectability condition. Also note that a randomized code is generally needed if the attacks have arbitrary memory [31] - [33] . For example, in watermarking games, knowing a deterministic code the adversary would decode and remove the message; deterministic codes are vulnerable to this kind of "surgical attack" [4] .
For randomized codes, the secret key shared between encoder and decoder is the source of common randomness.
For RM codes, the secret key specifies the value of the permutation π. The entropy rate of the secret key is
VII. PASSIVE WARDEN A passive warden introduces no degradation to the stegotext; in this case, D 2 = 0 and Y = X, i.e.,
This results in simplified expressions for the perfectly secure steganographic capacity in (11) and the random-coding error exponent in (13), see Propositions 3 and 4 below. The proofs of these propositions appear in Appendices IV and V, respectively.
Proposition 3:
For the passive-warden case (D 2 = 0), the maximization in (12) is achieved by U = X and
Remark. Since H(X|S) = H(X) − I(S; X) = H(S) − I(S; X), we have
I(S; X).
For the problem of encoding a source S subject to distortion D 1 , the minimum rate for representing the source is given by the rate-distortion function
where the inequality holds because
and the capacity-achieving codes for the passive-warden case are analogous to rate-distortion codes. Equality holds in (20) if the distribution that achieves the rate-distortion bound satisfies the steganographic property p X = p S .
Proposition 4:
For the passive-warden case (D 2 = 0), the random-coding exponent is given by
VIII. PENALTY FOR PERFECT SECURITY
The capacity expressions for public watermarking in [27] , [32] and for steganography in (11) take the same form, except that here the maximization of p XU|S is subject to the steganographic constraint. Consequently, we have and similarly
For some special cases, it is possible that the optimal covert channel for public watermarking automatically satisfies the perfect security condition, and (22) and (23) We consider S = Z q = {0, 1, 2, · · · , q − 1}, which is a group under addition modulo q. We shall use the notation k k mod q. The covertext S is uniformly distributed over Z q , i.e.,
The associated distortion function d :
If we write {d(i, j)} q−1 i, j=0 in a matrix form, the distortion matrix is cyclic-Toeplitz. Definition 9: Let V {0, 1, · · · , L−1}, p S = U(S), and U {0, 1, 2, · · · , qL−1}. Given any covert channel
, where v ∈ V, we define an associated covert channel p XU|S ∈ P XU|S , where U ∈ U, by
For any stochastic matrix p XV |S ∈ Q(L, p S , D 1 ), by (24) , the new channel p XU|S contains all of its q cyclically shifted versions (with respect to X and S) and these shifted versions are equally likely. Since the distortion function is cyclic, it is easy to verify that
Moreover, the marginal PMFp X induced by p S = U(S) and p XU|S is given bŷ
where p X is the marginal PMF induced by p S = U(S) and
Definition 10: The class Q Steg cyc (qL, p S , D 1 ) is the set of all such p XU|S defined in (24) . Clearly, we have
Definition 11: The class of cyclic attack channels subject to distortion D 2 is defined as
Any stochastic matrix p Y |X ∈ A cyc (D 2 ) is cyclic-Toeplitz. Also note that for any p X ∈ P X ,
Proposition 5: For the above q-ary information-hiding problem, the capacities for both the perfectly secure steganography game and the public watermarking game are the same. That is, the perfect security constraint in (2) does not cause any capacity loss. Moreover, there is no loss of optimality in restricting the maximization in (12) to Q Steg cyc (qL, p S , D 1 ) and the minimization to A cyc (D 2 ):
The proof is given in Appendix VI.
IX. EXAMPLE: BINARY-HAMMING CASE
We illustrate the above results through the following example, where S = {0, 1}, and the covertext is Bernoulli( The Hamming distortion metric is used: d(x, y) = 1 {x =y} .
A. Capacity
The capacity in the public watermarking game setting is given in [33] as follows
where The optimal attack channel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability D 2 . If d D2 ≤ D 1 ≤ 1/2, the optimal covert channel is also a binary symmetric channel: BSC(D 1 ) (i.e., |U| = 2, U = X, and p XU|S = p X|S ); otherwise, the capacity is achieved by time sharing: no embedding on a fraction of 1 − D1 dD 2 samples and embedding with the optimal covert channel BSC(d D2 ) on the rest of samples. Since the covertext S is a Bernoulli( 1 2 ) sequence, the output of the above optimal BSC(p) covert channel is also Bernoulli( 1 2 ). That is, the optimal covert channel for the public watermarking game satisfies p X = p S , and the perfect security constraint does not cause any loss in capacity, as stated by Proposition 5.
B. Random-Coding Exponent
In [33] , we numerically computed the random-coding exponent for public watermarking in the case of D 1 = 0.4, D 2 = 0.2, and |U| = 2 as shown in Fig. 4 . We found that the optimal covert channel is still a BSC(D 1 ) (p XU|S = p X|S ) with the time sharing strategy. It implies that at least for the case of |U| = 2, p X = p S and the perfect security constraint causes no loss in random-coding exponent either.
C. Randomized Nested Linear Codes-A Capacity-Achieving Code Construction
For information-embedding problems with a fixed attack channel BSC(D 2 ), deterministic nested binary linear codes were proposed to achieve capacity, where C 1 , a good source code with Hamming distance D 1 , is nested in C 2 , a good channel code over BSC(D 2 ) [38] , [39] . When
, the asymptotic code rate is equal to the capacity in the regime D 1 ≥ d D2 . In the regime D 1 < d D2 , the time-sharing strategy of (30) is applied. These nested linear codes apply to both public watermarking and steganography because BSC(D 2 ) is the optimal discrete memoryless attack channel. The stegotext codewords are elements of C 2 [38] , [39] .
In the passive-warden case (D 2 = 0), we simply let C 2 = F N 2 , and perfect security is achieved even without a secret key. In the active-warden case, C 2 is a subgroup of F N 2 , and randomization via the secret key plays an essential role in achieving perfect security. The strategy described below makes the transmitted stegotext uniformly distributed over F N 2 . The resulting code is a randomized nested binary linear code. Partition the whole space F N 2 into a disjoint union of C 2 and its cosets:
where C 2 ⊕ c is a coset of C 2 , the element c ∈ Ω 2 is a coset leader, and the set Ω 2 contains all coset leaders. We have
Let the secret key K be uniformly distributed over Ω 2 . For any k ∈ Ω 2 , the encoder output is defined as
where f 0 N (·, ·) is the deterministic encoder used for the information-embedding or watermarking problem. The decoding function ism . Since the output of the deterministic encoder is uniformly distributed over C 2 and the secret key K is uniformly distributed over Ω 2 , the coset decomposition property (32) ensures that the randomized encoder output of (34) is uniformly distributed over F N 2 . Hence perfect security is achieved. By (33) the entropy rate of the secret key is h(D 2 ), unlike the log 2 N growth required for general RM codes in (17) .
X. CONCLUSION
A strict definition of perfect security has been adopted in this paper, implying that even a warden with unlimited computational resources is unable to reliably detect the presence of a hidden message. We have studied the Shannontheoretic limits of communication performance under this perfect-security requirement and studied the structure of codes that asymptotically achieve those limits. The main results are summarized below.
• Perfectly secure steganography is closely related to the public watermarking problem of [27] , [33] . Positive capacity and random-coding exponents are achieved using stacked-binning codes and an MPMI decoder.
• Randomized codes are generally needed to achieve perfect security. The common randomness is provided by a secret key shared between the encoder and decoder. For i.i.d. covertexts, Proposition 1 shows that perfectly secure steganographic codes can be constructed using randomized permutations of a prototype CCC watermarking code that merely has an order-1 security property, i.e., the prototype code matches the first-order marginals of the covertext and stegotext, but not the full N -dimensional statistics.
• The cost of perfect security in terms of communication performance is the same as the cost of order-1 security.
However, if the covertext distribution is uniform and the distortion metric is cyclically symmetric, the security constraint does not cause any loss of performance.
Computational Security. This paper has focused on the interplay between communication performance and information-theoretic security, where security is achieved using a private key that is uniformly distributed over a group G sub . A more practical setup would involve a public-key system, in which a reduced set of representers of G sub is selected, each corresponding to a value of the key. Assume that the uniform distribution over this reduced set is computationally indistinguishable (in a sense to be precisely defined) from the uniform distribution over Also note that for any x, z ∈ T s , there exists a permutation π 0 such that x = π 0 z. Hence the value of the sum π 1 {πx=z} is independent of z (conditioned on z ∈ T s ), and so
Hence for any type class T s we have
where in (a) we have made the change of variables s ′′ = πs ′ , and in (b) we have used (36) with z = f N (s ′′ , m).
From (37) we obtain
hence the perfect security condition (2) is satisfied.
Now verifying the maximum-distortion constraint (1), for every π we have
where (a) uses the definition of f π N in (4), (b) holds because the distortion measure is additive, and (c) holds because of our initial assumption on the prototype f N . Therefore (1) holds.
Finally, let us evaluate the error probability for the RM code. Since the covertext source and the attack channel are memoryless, we have
for any permutation π. The error probability for the prototype code takes the form For the prototype code modulated with permutation π, we have
where (a) holds because of (38), (b) is obtained using the change in variables s ′ = πs, x ′ = πx, y ′ = πy, and (c) holds because the three sums run over all elements (s
and so the order of summation is inconsequential. Since (39) holds for every permutation π, the error probability for the RM code is equal to
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX II CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The converse is an extension of the proof in [33, Section 7] . Our upper bound on achievable rates is derived by
• replacing the perfect-security constraint with a weaker order-1 security constraint on the encoder:
(matching the types of input s and output x = f N (s, m) of the encoder f N ),
• replacing the almost-sure distortion constraint with an expected distortion constraint on the encoder:
• and providing the decoder with knowledge of the attack channel p Y |X .
Clearly any upper bound we derive under these assumptions is an upper bound on capacity as well.
For any rate-R code (f N , φ N ) and DMC p Y |X ∈ A(p X , D 2 ), we have
where the inequality is due to Fano's inequality. In order for P e not to be bounded away from 0, rate R needs to
The joint PMF of (M, S, X, Y) is given by
Owing to (43), for any
forms a Markov chain and so does
where the random variable W i is defined as
Using the same set of inequalities as in [26, Lemma 4] , we obtain
We define a time sharing random variable T , which is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , N } and independent of all other random variables, and define the quadruple of random variables
With this definition, the order-1 security constraint (40) becomes p X = p S , and the expected distortion constraint
By (45), the random variable W is defined over an alphabet of cardinality
Combining (42) and (46), we further derive
where U = (W, T ) is defined over an alphabet of cardinality
and the last inequality is due to I(T ; Y ) ≥ 0 and I(T ; S) = 0 (since T is independent of S).
Following the same arguments as in [33] , the sequence C Steg L is nondecreasing and converges to a finite limit
Therefore, continuing with (47), R is bounded by
This proves the converse part of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We have
Recall from [33, Lemma 3.1] that the sequence E P ubW M r,L (R) is nondecreasing and converges to a finite limit 
We next prove that for any L, a sequence of deterministic codes (f N , φ N ) with order-1 steganographic security exist with the property that
To prove the existence of such a code, we construct a random ensemble C of binning codes (f N , φ N ) with auxiliary alphabet U {1, 2, · · · , L} and show that the error probability averaged over C vanishes at rate E Steg r,L (R) as N goes to infinity. The proof is based on that of [33, Theorem 3.2] with special treatment on the encoder construction for perfect security. 
A. Encoder f N
Given a codebook C, a covertext sequence s, and a message m, the encoder finds in C(p s ) an l such that
If more than one such l exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let u = u(l, m). If no such l is available, the encoder declares an error and draws u from the uniform distribution over the conditional type class T * U|S (s). Then x is drawn from the uniform distribution over the conditional type class T * X|US (u, s). Recalling the discussion below (50), f N satisfies both the order-1 steganographic security constraint and the maximum distortion constraint.
B. Decoder φ N
Given y and the same codebook C used by the encoder, the decoder first seeks a covertext type p s andû ∈ C(p s ) that maximizes the penalized mutual information criterion 
The decoder then outputs the column indexm that corresponds toû. If there exist maximizers with more than one column index, the decoder declares an error.
C. Error Probability Analysis
The probability of error is given by
Following the steps in [33, Section 5] , the encoding error vanishes double-exponentially and only the decoding error contributes to P e,N on the exponential scale:
As N → ∞, by [33, Lemma 2.2], the above error exponent converges to
Clearly, E Steg r,L (R) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if the following conditions are met:
• the minimizing PMFp S is equal to p S ;
• the minimizing conditional PMFp Y |XUS is equal to p Y |X ; and
Therefore, E 
D. Perfect Security
Having established the achievability of E for a deterministic code (f N , φ N ) with order-1 security and maximum distortion D 1 , we invoke Proposition 1 to claim that the randomly modulated code with prototype (f N , φ N ) achieves the same error probability (hence error exponent) and distortion as the prototype.
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Coosing U = X yields the lower bound
On the other hand,
Note that (55) follows from the chain rule of mutual information I(U ; XS) = I(U ; X) + I(U ; S|X) = I(U ; S) + I(U ; X|S) and I(U ; S|X) ≥ 0. Choosing U = X achieves equality in both (55) and (56).
From (56), we obtain
Combining (54) and (57) yields (19) and proves the proposition.
APPENDIX V PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Since
Hence, the minimizingp Y |XUS in (14) is given bỹ
Consequently, the two terms of the cost function of (14) are reduced to
respectively. This yields
Similarly to the steps in the proof of Proposition 3, we derive that
The maximum on the left side is achieved by U = X. Combining (58) and (59) proves the proposition.
APPENDIX VI PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We prove Proposition 5 in two parts. We first establish that the right-hand side of (29) is an upper bound on the public watermarking capacity C P ubW M . Then we prove that the right-hand side of (29) is at the same time a lower bound on the perfectly secure steganographic capacity C Steg .
We start with the following lemma on the properties of p XU|S ∈ Q Steg cyc (qL, p S , D 1 ), which are used throughout this proof.
Lemma 1: Any p XU|S ∈ Q
Steg cyc (qL, p S , D 1 ) generated by (24) from its corresponding p XV |S ∈ Q(L, p S , D 1 ) has the following properties:
where p U (resp. p V ) is the marginal PMF of U (resp. V ) induced from p XU|S (resp. p XV |S ) and p S = U(S); and (iv)p X = U(S), wherep X is the marginal PMF of X induced from p XU|S and p S = U(S).
It is straightforward to verify Lemma 1(i)-(iv) from (24) .
A. Upper Bound
For the capacity of the public watermarking game,
Given any p XV |S ∈ Q(L, p S , D 1 ) and its associated p XU|S ∈ Q Steg cyc (qL, p S , D 1 ), we first verify that
From p S = U(S) and p XV |S , we obtain
From p S = U(S) and p XU|S , we have
where (63) is obtained by using Lemma 1(i) and (iii). Since I(S; U ) = H(S) − H(S|U ) and I(S; V ) = H(S) − H(S|V ), (61) follows from (64).
, we have the following lemma that is proved in Appendix VII.
Lemma 2:
From (61), Lemma 2, and the definition of J L in (10), we obtain
which yields
Therefore, (60) and (67) yield Thus, we have
Given p Y |X ∈ A(p X , D 2 ), we define q conditional PMFs: 
where (73) follows from the definition (72), and both (74) and (75) 
where (77) follows from Lemma 1(iii) and (76). 
and hence 
Combining the upper bound inequality in (68) and the lower bound inequality in (83), we prove the claim 
where (85) follows from (27) 
where to obtain (87) we have used Lemma 1(ii) and (27) 
where ( 
where (91) follows from Lemma 1(iii) and (88), and (92) follows from (86).
Sincep Y (y) = 1 q for any y ∈ S as shown in (90), we have 
Hence, Lemma 2 is proved. 
